

Ethics

University of Bayreuth
Summer 2025

Basics

INSTRUCTOR	Dr Matthias Brinkmann (matthias.brinkmann@uni-bayreuth.de)
TIME	Tuesday 14-16 c.t.
PLACE	H 10 in NW I
TUTORIALS	Miriam Schmidt (miriam.schmidt@uni-bayreuth.de) Wednesday 12-14 c.t., S 136 in NW III Simon Schuimer (simon.schuimer@uni-bayreuth.de) Monday 12-14 c.t., S138 in NW III

Overview

This course introduces you to ethics (also sometimes called ‘moral philosophy’), one of the major subfields of philosophy, and its three main subareas: applied ethics, normative ethics, and meta-ethics. We will be concerned with questions like the following:

- What makes one’s life go well?
- Should you be morally concerned with everyone’s happiness?
- What is the role of consent in sex?
- Is it morally wrong to lie to an artificial intelligence?
- Is morality objective? What would it mean for it to be objective?
- How can one gain any moral knowledge, if one can do so at all?

The course follows a systematic, rather than historical, outline of topics, although some classic works of ethics will be assigned as readings. The course will approach the topic through the lens of analytic philosophy, and largely focus on ethics in the Western tradition. Course language will be English.

No prior knowledge of the subject matter or background in philosophy is required. The course will not use a textbook, although you might wish to read some recommended general literature in parallel (see LITERATURE RECOMMENDATIONS).

Office Hours

Online office hours will be available during lecture weeks; you can also come to me before or after lectures.

If you have questions about the readings or the lectures, I would recommend to go to the tutorials and ask your tutors. If you still have unanswered questions, please email me; complex questions we might have to discuss in person.

Format

Lectures

Attendance at lectures is expected and important for doing well on the exam. You do not have to prepare readings before the lectures, but should do so for the tutorials.

Each lecture lasts around 90 minutes. There will be opportunities to ask questions. For questions which cannot be tackled in the course, ask your teaching assistants or talk to me during office hours.

Lecture slides will be made available after lectures.

Tutorials

Small group tutorials will be offered by teaching assistants. Attendance at tutorials is greatly encouraged and will enhance your understanding. You will discuss the assigned texts and also have an opportunity to ask questions about the course contents.

Assigned Readings

Each lecture will have two assigned texts: a primary text and a background text. Tutorials will go over the primary readings, which will often only be tackled in passing during the lectures. There will be questions about some of the assigned readings on the exam. The secondary readings will help you deepen your understanding of the course materials.

Exam

Credit points for this course are exclusively gained by exam. The exam will last *two hours* and consist of two parts. Both parts are weighed equally. The exam grade will be the grade for the entire course.

Details

Part A will consist of *eight* questions of which you have to answer *five*. The focus in this part is on your ability to *summarise and explain* course materials. Your answers should be relatively short, and only need to address the question asked. In grading, an emphasis will be put on accuracy, completeness, and precision in expression. The lectures and background readings will help you answering part A.

Part B will consist of *six* questions of which you have to answer *one*. The focus in this part is on your ability to *critically evaluate and discuss* course materials in depth. Your answer should take the form of a short essay. Questions will deliberately be a bit broader to allow you to set your own focus. In grading, an emphasis will be put on accuracy, critical thinking, and quality of argument. The tutorials and primary readings will help you answering part B.

Language

You may answer in English or German, but all answers must be in the *same* language. Language will not be directly graded—linguistic errors only matter to the degree that they diminish comprehensibility or lead to philosophical inaccuracies.

Grading

Each answer in part A will count 10%, collectively making up 50% of the entire grade. The answer in part B will constitute the other 50% of the final grade.

If three or more questions in part A receive a failing grade, or if part B receives a failing grade, then the *entire* exam is graded as failing. Aside from these exceptions, final grades will be the weighted mathematical average of grades for individual answers, rounded to the next grade step.

Plan

Please note I might adjust various aspects of the course, including topics and assigned texts, on short notice.

Date		Topic	Primary Texts
29.04.	1	Introduction	Thomson
I. Normative Ethics			
06.05.	2	Welfare	Nozick, Angner
13.05.	3	Consequentialism	Mill
20.05.	4	Deontological ethics	Kant
27.05.	5	Virtue ethics	Aristotle
II. Applied Ethics			
03.06.	6	Autonomy and consent	Hurd
10.06.		Whit Tuesday	
17.06.	7	Moral status: animals, the future, AI	Singer
24.06.		WITTGENSTEIN LECTURES	
01.07.	8	Collective obligations	Lomasky/Brennan
III. Metaethics			
08.07.	9	Subjectivism	Mackie
15.07.	10	Objectivism	Enoch
22.07.	11	Moral Epistemology	Huemer

Literature Recommendations

This course does not use a textbook. If you want to read more generally about ethics, the following are some good starting points. I would recommend, in particular, the works marked with an asterisk (*).

Encyclopedias and Handbooks

Copp, David, ed. 2007. *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*. Oxford University Press.

Düwell, Marcus, Christoph Hübenthal, and Micha Werner, eds. 2011. *Handbuch Ethik*. 3rd edition. Metzler.

The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (plato.stanford.edu) is one of the most extensive and up-to-date encyclopedias in philosophy. Students who wish to access a reliable online resource should consult it. I will not separately list SEP articles for each week.

Relevant articles (among others): 'Well-Being', 'Value Theory', 'Consequentialism', 'Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy', 'Deontological Ethics', 'Kant's Moral Philosophy', 'Virtue Ethics', 'Aristotle's Ethics', 'Personal Autonomy', 'Informed Consent', 'The Grounds of Moral Status', 'The Moral Status of Animals', 'Collective Responsibility', 'Metaethics', 'Moral Cognitivism vs Non-Cognitivism', 'Moral Realism', 'Moral Anti-Realism', 'Moral Disagreement', 'Moral Epistemology', 'Intuition'.

Textbooks

*Birnbacher, Dieter. 2013. *Analytische Einführung in die Ethik*. – amongst the German books I looked at, the most thorough and precise introduction

*Driver, Julia. 2007. *Ethics: The Fundamentals* – a very accessible introduction which goes over many similar topics as we do

Rachels, James/Rachels, Stuart. *Elements of Moral Philosophy* – a clearly written, general-purpose introduction to ethics

Normative ethics

*Kagan, Shelly. 1998. *Normative Ethics*. – a very clear introduction to main lines of argument in normative ethics

*Smart, J. J. C., and Bernard Williams. 1973. *Utilitarianism: For and Against*. – both contributions are lucid; Williams' critique of utilitarianism is justly famous

Applied ethics

Frey, R. G., and Christopher Wellman, eds. 2008. *A Companion to Applied Ethics*. Blackwell.

*Singer, Peter. 1979³2011. *Practical Ethics*. – a famous text in practical ethics; comes in several editions, make sure to get the latest version (3rd ed., 2011).

Metaethics

Miller, Alexander. 2003. *An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics*. – dated but still useful

*Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. *Moral Realism: A Defence*. – focusses on moral realism but touches on many areas of metaethics; opinionated but accessible

van Roojen, Mark. 2015. *Metaethics: A Contemporary Introduction* – a more up-to-date version covering similar ground to Miller

History of ethics

Arrington, Robert. 1998. *Western Ethics : An Historical Introduction*. Blackwell. – a solid overview of main ethicists in the western tradition

Rawls, John. 2009. *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*. – Rawls is famous in his own right, but his lectures are accessible and readable; covers Hume, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel

Schneewind, Jerome. 1998. *The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press.

Topics

The following is a list of course contents. Assigned readings are listed under 'Readings'. Recommended literature for further reading is listed under 'Additional Readings'. Particularly recommended texts are marked with an asterisk (*). All additional literature is optional.

1 Introduction: moral reasoning

Topics

- (1) Organisational matters and course structure
- (2) Subareas of ethics; reconstructive versus normative ethics
- (3) Moral categories of assessment
- (4) An example of moral reasoning: Trolley cases
- (5) The Is-Ought gap; the Euthyphro dilemma

Readings

PRIMARY: Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1985. "The Trolley Problem." *Yale Law Journal* 94 (6): 1395–1415.

SECONDARY: Kagan, *Normative Ethics*, sec. 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 = pp. 1-17.

Additional Readings

Trolley cases

Foot, Philippa. 2002. "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double-Effect." In *Virtues and Vices*. Oxford University Press.

Fried, Barbara. 2012. "What Does Matter? The Case for Killing the Trolley Problem (Or Letting It Die)." *Philosophical Quarterly* 62 (248): 505–29.

Quinn, Warren. 1989. "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 18 (4): 334–51.

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1976. "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem." *The Monist* 59 (2): 204–17.

Unger, Peter. 1996. *Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence*. Oxford University Press.

Part I. Normative Ethics

I.2 Welfare

Topics

- (1) The concept of welfare
- (2) Hedonism/mental-state theories; the experience machine
- (3) Preference-fulfilment views; various objections
- (4) Objective views; the capability approach
- (5) Welfare in economics and empirical research

Readings

PRIMARY: Nozick, Robert. 1974. *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. 'The Experience Machine', 42–5.
 PRIMARY: Angner, Erik. 2017. 'Well-Being and Economics'. In *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being*, edited by Guy Fletcher, 492–503. Routledge.
 SECONDARY: Kagan, Norman. *Normative Ethics*, sec. 2.1 and 2.2, pp. 25–41.

Additional Readings

Overviews

Fletcher, Guy. 2016. *The Philosophy of Well-Being: An Introduction*. Routledge.
 Fletcher, Guy, ed. 2017. *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being*. Routledge.

Axiology

Korsgaard, Christine. 1983. 'Two Distinctions in Goodness'. *Philosophical Review* 92 (2): 169–95.
 Moore, G. E. 1993 [1903]. *Principia Ethica*. Edited by Thomas Baldwin. Rev. ed. Cambridge University Press. Chapter I, 'The subject-matter of ethics'.
 Schroeder, Mark. 'Value Theory'. plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-theory/.

The concept of welfare

Haybron, Daniel. 2003. 'What Do We Want from a Theory of Happiness?' *Metaphilosophy* 34 (3): 305–29.
 Keller, Simon. 2009. 'Welfarism'. *Philosophy Compass* 4 (1): 82–95.

Theories of welfare

Adams, Robert. 2002. *Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics*. Oxford University Press.
 Feldman, Fred. 2004. *Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism*. Oxford University Press. – defends a version of hedonism
 *Griffin, James. 1988. *Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance*. Oxford University Press. – defends a preference account
 Hooker, Brad. 2015. 'The Elements of Well-Being'. *Journal of Practical Ethics* 3 (1): 15–35.
 Kagan, Shelly. 1992. 'The Limits of Well-Being'. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 9 (2): 169–89.
 *Kagan, Shelly. 2009. 'Well-being as Enjoying the Good'. *Philosophical Perspectives* 23 (1): 253–72. – defends a hybrid approach
 Scanlon, Tim. 1975. 'Preference and Urgency'. *Journal of Philosophy* 72 (19): 655–69.
 Sobel, David. 1994. 'Full Information Accounts of Well-Being'. *Ethics* 104 (4): 784–810.

Adaptive preferences

Elster, Jon. 1985. *Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3, 'Sour Grapes'.

Khader, Serene. 2011. *Adaptive Preferences and Women's Empowerment*. Oxford University Press.

*Nussbaum, Martha. 2001. 'Adaptive Preferences and Women's Options'. *Economics and Philosophy* 17 (1): 67–88.

Empirical research on happiness

Adler, Matthew, and Marc Fleurbaey, eds. 2016. *The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy*. Oxford University Press.

Alexandrova, Anna. 2017. *A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being*. Oxford University Press.

Besser, Lorraine. 2020. *The Philosophy of Happiness*. Routledge.

Dowding, Keith. 2009. 'What Is Welfare and How Can We Measure It?' In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics*, edited by Don Ross and Harold Kincaid, 511–39.

Haybron, Daniel. 2008. *The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being*. Oxford University Press.

1.3 Utilitarianism

Topics and Keywords

- (1) Features and variants of utilitarianism; consequentialism
- (2) Practical implications: impartiality, self-sacrifice, effective altruism
- (3) The cluelessness objection
- (4) The demandingness objection
- (5) The integrity objection; indirect consequentialism

Readings

PRIMARY: Mill, *On Utilitarianism*, chapter 2, 'What utilitarianism is' and chapter 4, 'Of what sort of proof the principle of utility is susceptible'.

SECONDARY: Driver, *Ethics: The Fundamentals*, chapter 4, 'Contemporary consequentialism'.

Additional Readings

Overviews

Driver, Julia. 2012. *Consequentialism*. Routledge.

Hooker, Brad. 2010. 'Consequentialism'. In *The Routledge Companion to Ethics*, edited by John Skorupski, 444–55. Routledge.

*McAskill, William, Darius Meissner, and Richard Yetter Chappell. *An Introduction to Utilitarianism*. utilitarianism.net/textbook/. – a concise and precise introduction to utilitarianism

Mulgan, Tim. 2007. *Understanding Utilitarianism*. Acumen.

Classical works

Bentham, Jeremy. 1789. *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*.

Moore, G. E. 1903. *Principia Ethica*.

Sidgwick, Henry. 1874. *The Methods of Ethics*.

Contemporary advocates

Hooker, Brad. 2000. *Ideal Code, Real World: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality*. Oxford University Press. – a contemporary defence of rule-consequentialism

*Jackson, Frank. 1991. 'Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection'. *Ethics* 101 (3): 461–82. – defends subjective consequentialism

*Railton, Peter. 1984. 'Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality'. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 13 (2): 134–71. – defends and explains the psychology of the "sophisticated" act-consequentialist.

Sen, Amartya. 1982. 'Rights and Agency'. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 11 (1): 3–39. – Advocates a very broad, agent-relative form of "consequential evaluation".

Advanced topics

Brown, Campbell. 2011. 'Consequentialize This'. *Ethics* 121 (4): 749–71. – asks whether all moral theories can be turned into consequentialist ones.

de Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna and Peter Singer. 2010. 'Secrecy in Consequentialism: A Defence of Esoteric Morality'. *Ratio* 23 (1): 34–58.

Kagan, Shelly. 2000. 'Evaluative Focal Points'. In *Morality, Rules, and Consequences: A Critical Reader*, edited by Elinor Mason, Dale Miller, and Brad Hooker, 134–55. Rowan & Littlefield. – discusses and favours a version of consequentialism that doesn't prioritise any particular "evaluative focal point".

Objections

Foot, Philippa. 1985. 'Utilitarianism and the Virtues'. *Mind* 94: 196–209. – An early, influential criticism of consequentialism.

Kapur, Neera Badhwar. 1991. 'Why It Is Wrong to Be Always Guided by the Best: Consequentialism and Friendship'. *Ethics* 101 (3): 483–504.

Lenman, James. 2000. 'Consequentialism and Cluelessness'. *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 29 (4): 342–70.

Mulgan, Tim. 2001. *The Demands of Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press.

Scheffler, Samuel. 1982. *The Rejection of Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press.

1.4 Deontological ethics

Topics

- (1) Deontological ethics
- (2) Constraints, agent-centered prerogatives, 'paradox' of deontology
- (3) Kant: maxims and the good will
- (4) Kant: the three formulations of the categorical imperative

Readings

PRIMARY: Kant, *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, secs. I and II

SECONDARY: McNaughton, David, and Piers Rawling. 2006. 'Deontology'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, edited by David Copp. Oxford University Press.

A usable German-language version of Kant's complete works can be found online at www.korpora.org/Kant/. The best print version comes from Meiner, but any edition which provides page numbers to the Academy version is acceptable. The best English translations of Kant are generally from Cambridge University Press.

Additional readings

General works

Kamm, Frances. 2007. *Intricate Ethics*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 1, 'Nonconsequentialism'.

Ross, William. 2009. *The Right and the Good*. Reprint of 1930 edition. Clarendon Press. – An influential non-Kantian form of deontology.

Scheffler, Samuel. 2003. *The Rejection of Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press.

Introductions to Kant

- Hill, Thomas. 2006. 'Kantian Normative Ethics'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, edited by David Copp. Oxford University Press.
- *Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*. Cambridge University Press. – A selection of famous exegetical articles on the *Groundwork*.
- *Schönecker, Dieter, and Allen Wood. 2011. *Kants 'Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten': Ein einführender Kommentar*. UTB. – The best stand-alone introduction to the *Groundwork*.
- Timmermann, Jens. 2007. *Kants' Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary*. Cambridge University Press. – A thorough, section-by-section commentary on the *Groundwork*.
- Wood, Allen. 2008. *Kantian Ethics*. Cambridge University Press. – Wood is an engaging writer who is especially concerned with dispelling misunderstandings about Kant's ethics.

The good will

- Baron, Marcia. 1984. 'The Alleged Moral Repugnance of Acting from Duty'. *Journal of Philosophy* 81 (4): 197–220.
- Herman, Barbara. 1981. 'On the Value of Acting from the Motive of Duty'. *Philosophical Review* 90 (3): 359–82.
- Langton, Rae. 1992. 'Duty and Desolation'. *Philosophy* 67 (262): 481–.
- Timmermann, Jens. 2009. 'Acting from duty: inclination, reason and moral worth'. In *Kant's Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals: a critical guide*, edited by Jens Timmermann, 45–62.
- Wolf, Susan. 1982. 'Moral Saints'. *Journal of Philosophy* 79 (8): 419–39.

Formulations of the categorical imperative

FORMULA OF UNIVERSAL LAW

- Mackie, J. L. 1985. 'Three Stages of Universalization'. In *Persons and Values*. Clarendon Press.
- O'Neill, Onora. 1989. *Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5, "Consistency in Action".
- Parfit, Derek. 2011. *On What Matters*. Oxford University Press. Volume 1, chapter 12.

FORMULA OF HUMANITY

- Herman, Barbara. 1984. 'Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons'. *Ethics* 94 (4): 577–602.
- O'Neill, Onora. 1989. *Constructions of Reason. Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 7, "Universal laws and ends-in-themselves".
- Hill, Thomas. 1980. 'Humanity as an End in Itself'. *Ethics* 91 (1): 84–99.
- Parfit, Derek. 2011. *On What Matters*. Volume 1, chapters 9 and 10.

FORMULA OF AUTONOMY/KINGDOM OF ENDS

- Wood, Allen. 1999. *Kant's Ethical Thought*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 5, 'The formula of autonomy and the realm of ends'.
- Rawls, John. 2000. *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy*. 'The Categorical Imperative: The Third Formulation' (p. 200–216).
- Flikschuh, Katrin. 2009. 'Kant's kingdom of ends: metaphysical, not political'. In *Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide*, edited by Jens Timmermann, 119–139. Cambridge University Press.

I.5 Virtue ethics

Topics

- (1) Introduction: virtue ethics; core ideas
- (2) Aristotle: argument from function; eudaimonia; virtue
- (3) Confucian ethics: ritual, role obligations, moral development
- (4) The action-guidance objection

(5) Moral particularism

Readings

PRIMARY: Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, excerpts.

SECONDARY: Russell, Daniel. 'Virtue ethics, happiness, and the good life' in Russell, Daniel, ed. 2013. *The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics*. Cambridge University Press.

Additional Readings

Overviews

Russell, Daniel, ed. 2013. *The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics*. Cambridge University Press.

van Zyl, Liezl. 2019. *Virtue Ethics: A Contemporary Introduction*. Routledge.

Contemporary advocates

Anscombe, G. E. M. 1958. 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. *Philosophy* 33 (124): 1–19.

Foot, Philippa. 2002. *Virtues and Vices*. Oxford University Press.

*Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1999. *On Virtue Ethics*. Oxford University Press. – recommended: chapters 1, 5–6, 8.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1984. *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. University of Notre Dame Press.

McDowell, John. 1998. 'Virtue and Reason'. In *Mind, Value, and Reality*, 50–75. Harvard University Press.

Nussbaum, Martha. 1999. 'Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?' *Journal of Ethics* 3 (3): 163–201.

Aristotle's ethics

Broadie, Sarah. 1991. *Ethics With Aristotle*. Oxford University Press.

Kraut, Richard, ed. 2006. *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Blackwell.

Urmson, J. O. 1988. *Aristotle's Ethics*. Blackwell.

The problem of action-guidance

Annas, Julia. 2004. 'Being Virtuous and Doing the Right Thing'. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 78 (2): 61–75.

Johnson, Robert. 2003. 'Virtue and Right'. *Ethics* 113 (4): 810–34.

van Zyl, Liezl. 2011. 'Right Action and the Non-Virtuous Agent'. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 28 (1): 80–92.

Particularism

Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. *Ethics Without Principles*. Oxford University Press.

Jonsen, Albert, and Stephen Toulmin. 1988. *The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning*. University of California Press.

Confucian ethics

Goldin, Paul. 2010. *Confucianism*. Routledge. – a very clear and helpful introduction.

Ivanhoe, Philip. 2002. *Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mengzi and Wang Yang-ming*. Hackett.

*Ivanhoe, Philip, and Bryan van Norden, eds. 2023. *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*. 3rd ed. Hackett. – contains excerpts from most of the major works in classical Chinese philosophy with useful commentary

Olberding, Amy. 2016. 'Etiquette: A Confucian Contribution to Moral Philosophy'. *Ethics* 126 (2): 422–46.

Ramsey, John. 2016. 'Confucian Role Ethics: A Critical Survey'. *Philosophy Compass* 11 (5): 235–45.

Part II. Applied Ethics

II.6 Autonomy and consent

Topics

- (1) Personal autonomy
- (2) The nature of consent (mental state, action, hybrid)
- (3) Conditions for valid consent
- (4) Feminist accounts of autonomy and consent
- (5) Paternalism; the example of nudging

Readings

PRIMARY. Hurd, Heidi. 1996. 'The Moral Magic of Consent'. *Legal Theory* 2 (2): 121–46.
 SECONDARY. Beauchamp, Tom, and James Childress. 2009. *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 3, 'Respect for autonomy'.

Additional Readings

Autonomy

Bittner, Rüdiger. 2002. 'Autonomy, and Then'. *Philosophical Explorations* 5 (3): 217–28. – useful, brief critical piece
 Dworkin, Gerald. 1988. *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy*. Cambridge University Press.
 Frankfurt, Harry. 1971. 'Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person'. *Journal of Philosophy* 68 (1): 5–20.

Consent

Chadha, Karamvir. 2022. 'Sex and Consent'. In *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality*. Routledge. – useful, opinionated overview
 Dougherty, Tom. 2015. 'Yes Means Yes: Consent as Communication'. *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 43 (3): 224–53.
 Müller, Andreas, and Peter Schaber, eds. 2018. *The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent*. Routledge. – well-assembled handbook with many recommendable contributions
 *Srinivasan, Amia. 2021. *The Right to Sex*. Bloomsbury. – thought-provoking collection of essays on topics concerning sex; defends a feminist approach
 Wertheimer, Alan. 2003. *Consent to Sexual Relations*. Cambridge University Press. – analytically rigorous treatment of issues in the philosophy of consent, with many interesting cases

Paternalism

Cholbi, Michael. 2017. 'Paternalism and Our Rational Powers'. *Mind* 126 (501): 123–53.
 *Conly, Sarah. 2013. *Against Autonomy: Justifying Coercive Paternalism*. Cambridge University Press. – I recommend in particular chapter 1, 'Why value autonomy?'.
 Director, Samuel. 2024. 'Framing Effects Do Not Undermine Consent'. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 27 (2): 221–35.
 *Enoch, David. 2016. 'What's Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action'. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 116 (1): 21–48. – for advanced students
 Feinberg, Joel. 1971. 'Legal Paternalism'. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 1 (1): 105–24.
 Schmidt, Andreas, and Bart Engelen. 2020. 'The Ethics of Nudging: An Overview'. *Philosophy Compass* 15 (4): e12658.
 *Sunstein, Cass, and Richard Thaler. 2003. 'Libertarian Paternalism'. *American Economic Review* 93 (2): 175–79. – an influential defence of 'nudging', later expanded into a book

II.7 Moral status: animals, the future, and AI

Topics

- (1) The notion of moral status
- (2) The proposed grounds of moral status
- (3) The moral status of animals; the objection of speciesism
- (4) The moral status of AI
- (5) Future generations; the non-identity problem

Readings

PRIMARY: Singer, *Practical Ethics*. Chapter 3, 'Equality for animals?'

SECONDARY: Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Vincent Conitzer. 2021. 'How Much Moral Status Could Artificial Intelligence Ever Achieve?' In *Rethinking Moral Status*, edited by Steve Clarke, Hazem Zohny, and Julian Savulescu, 269–89. Oxford University Press.

Additional Readings

Moral status

Arneson, Richard. 1999. 'What, If Anything, Renders All Humans Morally Equal?' In *Peter Singer and His Critics*, edited by Dale Jamieson, 103–28. Blackwell.

Buss, Sarah. 2012. 'The Value of Humanity'. *Journal of Philosophy* 109 (5–6): 341–77.

Liao, Matthew. 2010. 'The Basis of Human Moral Status'. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 7 (2): 159.

Jaworska, Agnieszka, and Julie Tannenbaum. 'The Grounds of Moral Status', *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. plato.stanford.edu/entries/grounds-moral-status/

Animal ethics

Hills, Alison. 2005. *Do Animals Have Rights?* Icon.

McMahan, Jeff. 2008. 'Eating Animals the Nice Way'. *Daedalus* 137 (1): 66–76.

McMahan, Jeff. 2015. 'The Moral Problem of Predation'. In *Philosophy Comes to Dinner*. Routledge.

Regan, Tom. 1980. 'Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights'. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 9 (4): 305–24.

Williams, Bernard. 1985. 'The Human Prejudice'. In *Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline*.

Future generations

Parfit, Derek. 1984. *Reasons and Persons*. Clarendon Press. Part IV. – famous book in ethics that laid the groundwork for many contemporary debates

Greaves, Hilary, and William MacAskill. 2021. 'The Case for Strong Longtermism'. *Global Priorities Institute Working Paper 5-2021*. <https://globalprioritiesinstitute.org/hilary-greaves-william-macaskill-the-case-for-strong-longtermism-2/>.

Moral status of AI

*Gibert, Martin, and Dominic Martin. 2022. 'In Search of the Moral Status of AI: Why Sentience Is a Strong Argument'. *AI & Society* 37 (1): 319–30. – useful overview

Ladak, Ali. 2024. 'What Would Qualify an Artificial Intelligence for Moral Standing?' *AI and Ethics* 4 (2): 213–28.

Liao, Matthew. 2020. 'The Moral Status and Rights of Artificial Intelligence'. In *Ethics of Artificial Intelligence*, edited by Matthew Liao. Oxford University Press.

II.8 Collective obligations

Topics

- (1) The problem of causal impotence
- (2) Duties in collective action problems
- (3) Group agency and duties to form a group
- (4) The duty to vote

Readings

PRIMARY: Lomasky, Loren, and Geoffrey Brennan. 2000. 'Is There a Duty to Vote?' *Social Philosophy and Policy* 17 (1): 62–86.

SECONDARY: Nefsky, Julia. 2019. 'Collective Harm and the Inefficacy Problem'. *Philosophy Compass* 14 (4).

Additional Readings

*Parfit, Derek. 1984. *Reasons and Persons*. Clarendon Press. Chapter 3.

The problem of causal impotence

Broome, John. 2019. 'Against Denialism'. *The Monist* 102 (1): 110–29.

Kagan, Shelly. 2011. 'Do I Make a Difference?' *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 39 (2): 105–41.

Lawford-Smith, Holly. 2016. 'Difference-Making and Individuals' Climate-Related Obligations'. In *Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World*, 64–82.

Pinkert, Felix. 2015. 'What If I Cannot Make a Difference (and Know It)'. *Ethics* 125 (4): 971–98.

The impotence objection and meat-eating

Chignell, Andrew. 2016. 'Can We Really Vote with Our Forks? Opportunism and the Threshold Chicken'. In *Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments on the Ethics of Eating*, edited by Andrew Chignell, Terence Cuneo, and Matthew Halteman, 182–202. Routledge.

McMullen, Steven, and Matthew Halteman. 2019. 'Against Inefficacy Objections: The Real Economic Impact of Individual Consumer Choices on Animal Agriculture'. *Food Ethics* 2 (2): 93–110.

Acting as a group

Collins, Stephanie. 2013. 'Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties'. *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 91 (2): 231–48.

List, Christian, and Philip Pettit. 2011. *Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents*. Oxford University Press.

The problem of voting

Dowding, Keith. 2005. 'Is It Rational to Vote? Five Types of Answer and a Suggestion'. *British Journal of Politics & International Relations* 7 (3): 442–59.

Tuck, Richard. 2008. *Free Riding*. Harvard University Press.

Part III. Metaethics

III.9 Subjectivism

Topics

- (1) Meta-ethics: philosophy of language, phil. of mind, metaphysics
- (2) Non-cognitivism: claims and variants
- (3) The argument from moral motivation
- (4) The Frege-Geach problem
- (5) Mackie's error theory

Readings

PRIMARY. Mackie, John. 1977. *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*. Chapter 1, 'The subjectivity of values'.

SECONDARY. Schroeder, Mark. 2010. *Noncognitivism in Ethics*. Chapter 1, 'The problems of metaethics'.

Additional Readings

Non-cognitivism

Ayer, A. J. 1946 [1936]. *Language, Truth, and Logic*. Chapter 6.

Bar-On, Dorit, and James Sias. 2013. 'Varieties of Expressivism'. *Philosophy Compass* 8 (8): 699–713.

Blackburn, Simon. 1993. *Essays in Quasi-Realism*. Chapter 9, "How to be an ethical anti-realist".

Dreier, James. 2009. 'Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement.' *Philosophical Perspectives* 23 (1): 79–110.

Schroeder, Mark. 2008. 'What is the Frege-Geach Problem?' *Philosophy Compass* 3 (4): 703–720.

*Schroeder, Mark. 2010. *Noncognitivism in Ethics*. Routledge.

Smith, Michael. 1993. *The Moral Problem*. Chapter 2, "The Expressivist Challenge".

Nihilism/Error Theory

Joyce, Richard. 2001. *The Myth of Morality*. Cambridge University Press.

Mackie, John. 1977. *Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong*.

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 2006. *Moral Skepticisms*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 3, 'Are any moral beliefs true?'.

III.10 Objectivism

Topics

- (1) Moral relativism; objections to relativism
- (2) Moral realism; types of moral realism
- (3) Arguments for moral realism; the analogy with science
- (4) Evolutionary debunking arguments

Readings

PRIMARY: Enoch, David. 'Why I am an Objectivist about Ethics (And Why You Are, Too)'.

SECONDARY: Brink, David. *Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics*. Chapter 2, 'Moral realism and moral inquiry'.

Additional Readings

Relativism

*Gensler, Harry. 'Cultural Relativism.' In Shafer-Landau, *The Ethical Life*.

Harman, Gilbert. 1975. 'Moral Relativism Defended.' *Philosophical Review* 84 (1): 3–22.

Moser, Paul, and Thomas Carson, eds. 2000. *Moral Relativism: A Reader*. Oxford University Press.

Wong, David. 2009. *Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism*. Oxford University Press.

Moral realism

Brink, David. 1989. *Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics*. Cambridge University Press.

Enoch, David. 2011. *Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism*. Oxford University Press.

Parfit, Derek. 2011. *On What Matters*. Volume 2, sections 82, 87, 88, 90.

Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. *Moral Realism: A Defence*. Oxford University Press.

Wedgwood, Ralph. 2007. *The Nature of Normativity*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 9.

Evolutionary debunking arguments

*Kahane, Guy. 2011. 'Evolutionary Debunking Arguments'. *Noûs* 45 (1): 103–25.

Sauer, Hanno. 2018. *Debunking Arguments in Ethics*. Cambridge University Press.

Street, Sharon. 2006. 'A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value'. *Philosophical Studies* 127 (1): 109–66.

Vavova, Katia. 2015. 'Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism'. *Philosophy Compass* 10 (2): 104–16.

III.11 Moral epistemology

Topics

- (1) Reflective equilibrium; coherentism
- (2) Intuitions and intuitionism
- (3) Other sources of moral knowledge: foundations, emotions
- (4) Moral expertise and moral testimony

Readings

PRIMARY: Huemer, Michael. 2005. *Ethical Intuitionism*. Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 5, 'Moral knowledge'.

Additional Readings

Moral epistemology

Audi, Robert. 2004. *The Good in the Right*. Princeton University Press.

Prichard, H. A. 1912. 'Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?' *Mind* 21 (81): 21–37.

Zimmerman, Aaron. 2010. *Moral Epistemology*. Routledge.

Reflective equilibrium

Cath, Yuri. 2016. 'Reflective Equilibrium'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology*, edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler, and John Hawthorne, 213–30. Oxford University Press.

Rawls, John. 1999. *A Theory of Justice*. Revised Edition [First edition: 1971]. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. §4, §9.

Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey. 1996. 'Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory'. In *Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology*, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons. Oxford University Press.

Intuitions and intuitionism

Bedke, Matthew. 2010. 'Intuitional Epistemology in Ethics'. *Philosophy Compass* 5 (12): 1069–83.

Kagan, Shelly. 2001. 'Thinking About Cases'. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18 (2): 44.

Singer, Peter. 2005. 'Ethics and Intuitions'. *Journal of Ethics* 9 (3–4): 331–52.

INTUITIONS IN EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Berker, Selim. 2009. 'The Normative Insignificance of Neuroscience'. *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 37 (4): 293–329.

Greene, Joshua. 2007. 'The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul'. In *The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Disease, and Development*, edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. MIT Press.

Moral experts and moral testimony

Hills, Alison. 2009. 'Moral Testimony and Moral Epistemology'. *Ethics* 120 (1): 94–127.

Hills, Alison. 2013. 'Moral Testimony'. *Philosophy Compass* 8 (6): 552–59.

Hopkins, Robert. 2007. 'What Is Wrong with Moral Testimony?' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 74 (3): 611–34.

Howell, Robert. 2014. 'Google Morals, Virtue, and the Asymmetry of Deference'. *Noûs* 48 (3): 389–415.

McShane, Paddy Jane. 2018. 'Moral Testimony and Moral Understanding'. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 15 (3): 245–71.

Singer, Peter. 1972. 'Moral Experts'. *Analysis* 32 (4).

Sliwa, Paulina. 2012. 'In Defense of Moral Testimony'. *Philosophical Studies* 158 (2): 175–95.

Information for Exam

Basics

The exam for *Introduction to Ethics* will be on **5 August at 14:00** (s.t.) in S5 (GWII). Please be 15 minutes early (13:45) and bring your student ID. There will be further information closer to the date of the exam. If you have a right to accommodation, please contact me in advance so that the relevant adjustments can be made in your individual case.

For questions concerning the exam or any topics discussed in the lectures, please talk to your tutors or me. You can also make an appointment at office hours with me to talk about any questions you might have.

The exam will last *two hours* and consist of two parts. Both parts are weighed equally. The exam grade will be the grade for the entire course.

Details for Part A

Part A will consist of **eight** questions of which you have to answer **five**. There will at least be 3 questions on normative ethics, 2 questions on applied ethics, and 2 questions on metaethics.

If you answer more than five questions, then only the five highest-graded questions will be taken into account; but I do *not* recommend wasting time on answering more than five questions.

Aim to use *at most* 10 minutes for each question.

SAMPLE QUESTION

Explain the preference-satisfaction theory of welfare, and one standard objection against this theory.

EXPECTATIONS AND CRITERIA FOR GRADING

The focus in this part is on your ability to *summarise and explain* course materials. Your answers should be relatively short. As a rule of thumb, aim for 100 words *or less*. In grading, an emphasis will be put on accuracy, completeness, and precision in expression.

Accuracy. This should be self-explanatory: your answer must be *correct*. It should be an accurate description of the philosophical ideas you learned in the lectures or the readings. However, what matters is that you can describe the ideas clearly, not that you repeat them in identical fashion as they appeared in the lectures.

Completeness (but also Succinctness). Answer everything the question asks for, *and nothing more*. Including additional but unnecessary material will not help you and might even give the impression that you are trying to ‘pad’ your answer. Moreover, read the question carefully! Don’t answer something which isn’t there. For example, if the question asks you to explain the good will in Kant, then you do not have to say anything about the categorical imperative.

To return to the sample question, it is useful to start out by defining the preference-satisfaction theory of welfare *in one sentence*. Being brief is *good* here, not bad: you show your ability to define a philosophical position

succinctly. If the definition you give is overly complicated or very long, this also suggests that you cannot explain yourself clearly.

After this definition, you might want to add one or two sentences of explanation of your definition, if necessary. Again, stick to the question. It is not necessary to explain alternatives to the preference-satisfaction theory, for example. But you might wish to briefly say what a 'preference' is, or what it means for a preference to be satisfied. You might also already mention an important feature of the preference-satisfaction theory that will be important for the objection you discuss.

Continuing with the second part of the question, you can then choose any of the objections against preference-satisfaction theories tackled in the lectures, or which you might know from the literature. Briefly describe the objection, perhaps in two or three sentences. If you wish, you could include a clarifying example, but again be brief: one or two sentences should be enough. Note that the question is *not* asking you how the preference theorist might respond to the objection, so you don't have to go into that detail!

The question is also *not* asking you to give your own opinion or your own evaluation, so giving this is also not necessary; it is enough if the objection is one that is commonly made and which, at least on first sight, seems to be a problem for preference-satisfaction theories. In general, part A will never ask you to give your own opinion.

Precision in Expression. Philosophers use words carefully. This is why it is particularly important that you can express yourself precisely. If you follow the lectures, you might write

According to preference-satisfaction theories, welfare is the fulfilment of preferences.

It is not important that you know the definition word-for-word, however. Take, for example, the following definition,

According to preference-satisfaction theories, well-being is achieved through the realisation of individual preferences or desires.

This is a different definition but overall equally good. It says that well-being 'is achieved through' preference satisfaction, but not that it *is* well-being. This is a slight difference, but acceptable. The differences between 'well-being' and 'welfare', and 'realisation' and 'fulfilment' are also irrelevant. Less good is the following definition,

According to preference-satisfaction theories, getting one's preferences is important for welfare.

This definition is imprecise in two ways. It is unclear what it means to "get" a preference; and it is too vague to say that fulfilling preference is "important for" welfare (important how? In which way?). While this definition still gets the core of the idea behind the theory right, it is much too imprecise. This definition is likely to decrease your grade. Lastly, consider

According to preference-satisfaction theories, people are motivated by their preferences.

While this is a reasonably clear definition, it is *inaccurate*. The preference-satisfaction theory is *not* an empirical theory about how people act, but a moral theory of what makes people's lives better. If this definition would be used in an answer, it would likely be graded badly. If the rest of the answer showed no better understanding of the theory, the answer might even be graded as failing.

LEARNING FOR PART A

The lectures and background readings will help you answering part A. Make sure you have followed and understood all lecture contents. Use the slides as a memory *help*. As suggested above, it is not necessary to memorise the slides: you can get full points if you correctly describe an *idea*, even if your exact *formulation* is different. Similarly, it does not matter that you remember the precise details of examples or thought experiments discussed in the class, as long as you remember what the *point* behind those examples was.

Details for Part B

Part B will consist of *six* questions of which you have to answer only *one*. There will at least be 2 questions on normative ethics, 2 questions on applied ethics, and 1 question on metaethics.

Aim to use at least one hour for this part.

SAMPLE QUESTIONS

Is being a utilitarian compatible with being deeply committed to people one loves?

EXPECTATIONS AND CRITERIA FOR GRADING

The focus in this part is on your ability to *critically evaluate and discuss* course materials in depth. Your answer should take the form of a short essay. Before you start, you might want to take around five minutes to sketch the structure of your answer. You can use, if you want, headings in your answer.

In grading, an emphasis will be put on accuracy, critical thinking, and quality of argument. You are also expected to choose your own focus.

Choose your Focus. Questions in this part will deliberately be broader to allow you to set your own focus. You cannot, and *should not*, try to do everything in your answer. With respect to the sample question, for example, many approaches are possible. For example:

1. You could take one of the five standard commitments of utilitarianism and see whether relaxing or replacing it helps with commitments.
2. You could consider indirect utilitarianism, sketch what form of indirectness would be useful in this case, and discuss such a position.
3. You could discuss a concrete example of friendship and see under what conditions utilitarianism demands to give up on one's friends; you could then see how demanding or plausible those situations are.

4. You could focus on Mill's *On Utilitarianism* and see whether you think Mill's position has the resources to answer this objection.

None of these options are better than the others; what approach you choose is a matter of your personal taste. Further options are possible, of course.

Accuracy. In your answer, you might have to explain something from the lecture, or the readings, or something you learned from elsewhere. The relevant rule of thumb is: *only explain material if it is relevant*. For example, with respect to the sample question, it will be important to explain, in the beginning, why there might be a conflict between being a utilitarian and being committed to one's loved ones. For this purpose, it might be useful to give a one-sentence definition of utilitarianism, and explain one of its defining features, impartiality. But it will *not* be useful to explain other aspects of utilitarianism, or other objections, or different versions of utilitarianism, etc., *except* if these are relevant to your argument. As a rule of thumb, you should not spend more than one third of your answer on explaining or repeating material which already appeared in the lectures.

Including lots of irrelevant material in your answer is, in fact, a sign of a bad answer, not a good answer. The aim of part B is not to examine whether your knowledge of the material is complete, but whether you can think by yourself using the material you learned.

Critical Thinking. It does not matter what position you take in your essay; in the sample question, for example, you could argue for or against utilitarianism, or you could give a more complicated 'it depends' answer (although then you would need to specify *what* the answer depends on!). But whatever your answer, *you need to take a stance*. It needs to be clear what position you argue for, and you cannot just do a neutral description of someone else's position or the disagreement between two other philosophers.

Moreover, critical thinking in philosophy requires you to be able to see both sides of the argument. This means that one important skill is to consider possible objections to your own argument. In doing so, you should consider the *strongest possible response* of your opponent. If you consider objections which are only trivial or superficial, you fail to show that you can think about your position 'from the other side'. Think like this: who would be own worst enemy? What would they say? What could I respond to them?

Quality of Argument. Your argument should display the features of a good philosophical argument:

1. the writing is precise in expression (see above), and easy to understand
2. the writer shows understanding of the position s/he defends or criticises, as well as alternative positions or options
3. difficult concepts and ideas are explained, and illustrated through examples where appropriate
4. the argument has individually clear and easily discernible steps, and important or controversial assumptions are highlighted as such

5. the argument consists of logically valid steps and is internally coherent
6. the argument possesses no obvious gaps, and the strongest objections are answered at adequate depth

This is not a conclusive or complete list, and assessment will be holistic. In general, excellent questions will go into depth and go beyond what has been covered in the lectures. They show that you can critically and independently think about philosophy, while also being conversant in the philosophical tradition.

LEARNING FOR PART B

The tutorials and primary readings will help you in answering part B. In general, this part of the exam will require you to think beyond the lectures. What might also help you in preparing part B is discussing course materials with fellow students, and reading beyond the required readings. The syllabus will help you find additional readings, but you might also consider (for example) reading articles on the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. As you only need to answer one out of six questions, you will probably want to focus on a few selected topics you prepare at greater depth.

Language

You may answer in English or German, but all answers must be in the *same* language. In general, I recommend using English, as the lectures, the readings, and the tutorials were in English.

Language will *not* be directly graded—linguistic errors only matter to the degree that they diminish comprehensibility or lead to philosophical inaccuracies. In general, try to avoid long and complicated sentence structures, even in your native language!

Grading

Each answer in part A will count 10%, collectively making up 50% of the entire grade. The answer in part B will constitute the other 50% of the final grade. Answers in part A will be graded in full grade steps (1.0, 2.0, ...) while answers in part B will be graded with intermediate steps (1.0, 1.3, 1.7, 2.0, ...).

If three or more questions in part A receive a failing grade, or if part B receives a failing grade, then the *entire* exam is graded as failing. Aside from these exceptions, final grades will be the weighted mathematical average of grades for individual answers, rounded to the next grade step.

50512 Ethics

University of Bayreuth, Summer Term 2025

Exam Date: 16.07.2025

Answer both parts A and B. You may answer in English or German, but all answers must be in the same language.

Time: 2 hours.

PART A

You must answer **five** questions.

1. Explain qualitative hedonism, and one objection to it.
2. Explain the demandingness objection to utilitarianism, and one response the utilitarian can give.
3. Explain Kant's difference between 'acting out of duty' and 'acting in accordance with duty', and how this distinction relates to his idea of moral worth.
4. Describe one way how a virtue ethicist might answer the action-guidance problem for virtue ethics.
5. Define nudging and give one example of a nudging intervention.
6. Explain the overlap problem for cognitive ability theories of moral status.
7. Describe one response to the problem of causal inefficacy.
8. Explain the difference between relativism and error theory.

PART B

You must answer **one** question.

1. Is welfare the fulfilment of preferences?
2. What should the utilitarian respond to the uncertainty objection? Does the response succeed?
3. 'Humans have no natural functions. This is why Aristotle's function argument fails.' Do you agree?
4. Could someone validly consent to be killed and eaten?
5. Is free-riding morally wrong if it does not harm anyone? Why or why not?
6. What is the best argument for non-cognitivism? Does it succeed?